Presidential Election, 20 October and 3 November 2024

The Moldovan president is elected through popular vote, for a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. If no candidate wins a majority in the first round of voting, there is a second round between the two leading candidates. The prime minister is nominated by the president and confirmed by parliament, and holds the most executive authority (Freedom House 2024). The 2024 presidential election took place on 20 October and had 11 candidates. A constitutional referendum relating to Moldova’s aspiration to EU accession took place alongside the presidential election. The primary election management body in Moldova is the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) (IFES 2024). Voting in Moldova is voluntary (ACE n.d.).

The campaign period was marked by unregulated “third-party” online advertising, foreign interference and disinformation from Russian sources on the anti-EU side of the referendum (IEOM 2024). Monetary incentives were offered to promote the referendum’s “No” campaign on Facebook and recruit others to do so. The payment system was traced (Olari 2024) to “Evrazia”, a Russian  NGO with ties to the Kremlin and Ilan Shor – a fugitive oligarch under US sanctions for a $USD 1bn theft, money-laundering and other offences (US Treasury 2022; Reuters 2024a). 

Millions of dollars linked to Ilan Shor were reportedly smuggled for extensive vote-buying efforts, with the General Police documenting at least 130,000 citizens affected by bribes and over $USD 15 million illicitly transferred from Russia in September 2024 alone (Olari 2024; Losovsky et al. 2024). Russian operatives allegedly circumvented airport checks by utilizing the MIR payment card system of the Russian bank Promsvyazbank  (Necsutu 2024). Investigation into the vote-buying scheme led to “Victory” being designated a “camouflaged electoral bloc” and denied registration by the CEC (IEOM 2024).

An International Election Obervation Mission (IEOM) monitored the election, a collaboration between the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE-ODIHR); the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and European Parliament. Harassment of journalists online was noted, primarily targeted towards women. Four out of 11 presidential candidates were female. However, women were well represented in the field of election administration and often observed speaking at campaign events. Very few incidents of anti-female rhetoric were observed; intolerant, anti-LGBTI language was ‘repeatedly observed’ (IEOM 2024).

The CEC receives submitted complaints about presidential candidates and referendum participants. The IEOM noted that these complaints were not always posted when received—mostly those regarding misuse of office or administrative resources—reducing transparency in the electoral process. A low level of trust in the electoral dispute resolution mechanisms was noted (IEOM 2024).

Pro-Western Maia Sandu won her second term in a runoff on 3 November against pro-Russian Alexandr Stoianoglo. This win was largely due to diasporan votes as Sandu lost the votes within the borders, but gained large support from abroad (Balmforth and Tanas 2024). 

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov claimed that the election was neither free nor fair due to a “hard-to-explain” rise in votes supporting President Maia Sandu and an EU approach. Peskov claimed that the opposition had been denied opportunities to campaign, and that they had been repressed by authorities (Reuters 2024b). Voter turnout was 51.68 per cent, a decrease compared to the 2020 presidential election which saw a 58.22 per cent turnout (International IDEA n.d.).